University of Connecticut

OpenCommons@UConn
Faculty Articles and Papers

School of Law

2003

The Secession Reference and the Limits of Law
Richard Kay
University of Connecticut School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_papers
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons
Recommended Citation
Kay, Richard, "The Secession Reference and the Limits of Law" (2003). Faculty Articles and Papers. 15.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_papers/15

+(,121/,1(
Citation: 10 Otago L. Rev. 327 2001-2004

Content downloaded/printed from
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Mon Aug 15 16:57:54 2016
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from
uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
of your HeinOnline license, please use:
https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?
&operation=go&searchType=0
&lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0078-6918

The Secession Reference and the Limits of Law
Richard S. Kay*
When the Supreme Court of Canada issued its judgement on the legality of
"unilateral" Quebec secession in August 19981 many Canadians did not know
what to make of it. The Court held that the only lawful way in which Quebec
might depart the Canadian federation was through one of the amendment
mechanisms provided in the Constitution Act 1982. It thus affirmed that Quebec
could not secede without the agreement of at least the Houses of the federal
Parliament and some number of provincial legislative assemblies. Prime Minister
Chretien declared the next day that the judgement was a "victory for all
Canadians." 2 The court also held, however, that upon a sufficient expression of
popular sentiment for separation in Quebec the government of the province
had a "right... to pursue secession." 3 In that case the federal government and
other provinces were obliged to enter into honest negotiations to attempt to
satisfy the desire for secession. Thus Premier Bouchard, on the same day,
confidently announced that the Court had "shake[n] the very foundations of
federalist strategy."4 No wonder one of the of the most common adjectives
applied to the decision was "solomonic." 5
My purpose in this paper is to consider the best way to characterize what the
Supreme Court did in the Secession Reference. The immediate importance of the
Court's judgement has perhaps receded as the intensity of separatist sentiment
in Quebec has diminished. But, in a country whose underlying constitutional
premises continue to be unsettled, it remains a critical artifact in any attempt to
forecast the constitutional future. More generally, it illustrates an unusual but
not unique phenomenon - the intervention of courts of law in the resolution of
disputes concerning the very presuppositions of the legal and political system
of which they form a part.
The Supreme Court's intervention capped a particularly dramatic phase in
the apparently endless controversy over the place of Quebec in the Canadian
confederation. In October 1995, the Quebec electorate rejected, by the narrowest
of margins, a referendum proposition that would have put in motion provincial
actions leading to a radically different relationship with the rest of Canada or to
outright independence. The strength of the separatist sentiment stirred the
federal government to initiate a policy with two aspects. First, it proposed a set
of conciliatory measures devolving more authority on the provincial government.
George and Helen England Professor of Law. University of Connecticut School of
Law. I am grateful for helpful comments on prior drafts by Peter Hogg, Michael
Lusztig, Warren Newman and Carol Weisbrod.
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. Subsequent references are
to the Court's paragraph numbers.
2

3
4

Toronto Star, August 221998 (available in LEXis-NExiS, News Library, Allnws File).
Para. 88.
Toronto Star, August 22 1998 (available in LExis-NExis, News Library, Allnws File).
See Irwin Cotfer, "Most Important Case Ever," Canadian Jewish News, August 27,
1998, pp. 1, 36 (available in LEXiS-NExiS, News Library, Allnws File).
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At the same time, however, it implemented what came to be called "Plan B".
The point of this strategy was to make clear that secession for Quebec could not
be achieved painlessly. The federal government might, for example, set its own
criteria for an expression of popular will sufficient to legitimize separation. And
even if sovereignty were agreed to principle, it might require financial
arrangements and territorial adjustments that would create difficulties for the
latent Quebec state. It was as part of this approach that the federal government
decided to seek an authoritative legal judgement affirming that Quebec had no
6
right to depart on its own terms.
In September 1996, the federal government posed three questions to the
Supreme Court under the reference jurisdiction created by the Supreme Court
Act. 7 These questions asked 1) whether Quebec could "under the Constitution
of Canada" secede "unilaterally"; 2) whether it had a right to do so under
international law; and 3) if there were a conflict between domestic and
international law, which would prevail.8 My focus here will be on the first
question. The Court, in response to the second question, held there was no right
of secession at international law, at least for people in the circumstances of the
inhabitants of Quebec. (It conceded, however, that a secession might end up
being "accorded legal status by Canada and other states" even if the separation
itself was not "achieved under colour of a legal right".9) As to the third question,
the Court concluded that there was no conflict between Canadian and
international law and, therefore, no answer was necessary.
The Court's response to the first question, about the right of secession "under
the Constitution of Canada," was not exactly straightforward. It did not canvass
the arguably controlling rules of constitutional law and infer an answer from
their contents. Instead, after disposing of some preliminary jurisdictional
questions, it set out a horseback history of constitutional developments in
Canada. It then identified and elaborated four "underlying principles " of the
Constitution. Such principles, the Court declared, "inform and sustain the
constitutional text; they are the vital unstated assumptions upon which the text
is based". Besides serving as aids to interpretation the Court stated that these
principles:
may in certain circumstances give rise to substantive legal obligations (have "full
legal force", as we described it in the PatriationReference ... ) which constitute
substantive limitations upon government action. These principles may give rise
to very abstract and general obligations, or they may be more specific and precise
in nature. The principles are not merely descriptive, but are also invested with a
powerful normative force, and are binding upon both courts and governments."

7

See generally CANADA WATCH, (August, 1996) (Special Double Issue: Focus on Plan
B).
R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 53.

8
9

Para. 2.
Para. 144.

10

Para. 54 citing Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] S.C.R.
753 at 845. It should be noted that the "we" referred to in the Court's quotation is
the separate judgement of Justices Martland and Ritchie dissenting from the
majority judgment that there was no legal impediment to the houses of the federal

6
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Over the next 27 paragraphs the Court elucidated four such principles:
federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for
minorities, warning that this list was "by no means exhaustive"., Only then
did the Court turn to the amendment provisions of the written constitution,
noting that a Quebec referendum, "in itself and without more, has no legal effect,
and could not in itself bring about unilateral secession" .12 As a consequence of
the "federalism" and "democratic" principles, however, a referendum result that
evidenced "a clear expression by the people of Quebec of their will to secede"
would trigger "a reciprocal obligation on all parties to Confederation to negotiate
constitutional changes to respond to that desire". This duty to negotiate was
explicitly stated to be part of the "law of the Constitution", and of "binding
status". And, the Court proclaimed, "[w]here there are legal rights there are
remedies". 13
Notwithstanding its clear statement that the duty to negotiate was binding at
law, the Court stated emphatically that the courts would entertain no complaints
based on this duty. It briefly discussed such questions as when the duty arose
("a clear majority on a clear question in favor of secession") and what issues
might properly be addressed (e.g., the national debt and boundaries). 4 These
obligations, although "part of the law of the Constitution", were "non-justiciable".
The reason for this conclusion was "the Court's appreciation of its proper role in
the constitutional scheme".1 5 The implementation of the constitutional operations
it had described required "political judgements and evaluations" and since "the
methods appropriate for the search for truth in a court of law are ill-suited" to
such a task, the court would exercise "no supervisory role" 16 Every legal right

"
12
13

14

is
16

Parliament requesting the Queen to place before the United Kingdom Parliament
the necessary legislation to effect the constitutional reforms of 1980-1982. Martland
and Ritchie JJ. made this assertion after citing four cases of the Supreme Court in
which either the Court or some justices of the Court had held legislation
unconstitutional without relying on specific textual provisions. Two cases dealt
with limitations on remedies for other unconstitutional actions. One involved an
impermissible province to federal government delegation of power and the last
affirmed that aprovincial statute could, not abridge the right of public discussion,
given that freedom of speech did not fall under a head of provincial jurisdiction.
Id. at 841-44. The dicta of Justices Martland and Ritchie was adopted by the Court
in support of its limited remedial order in Reference re Manitoba Language Rights,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, 751.
Para. 32.
Para. 87.
Paras. 98, 102.
See Patrick J. Monahan, Public Policy Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in the
Secession Reference, 10 NAT. J. CONST. L. 65, 84 (1999-2000). As the text indicates, I
interpret the judgement as expressing a "legal" duty to negotiate. It is possible to
read this duty as neither legal nor conventional but some third kind of
constitutional obligation. See Warren J. Newman, THE QUEBEC SECESSION REFERENCE:
THE RULE OF LAW AND THE POSITION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA. 55-57, 72-73
(1999). Given the non-justiciability of the duty and its consequent practical
equivalence with convention duties, the exact label is not a critical matter for me.
Para. 100.
Para. 98.
Paras. 100-101. It might be noted that there would have been nothing intrinsically
foreign to judicial practice in judicial oversight of aduty to negotiate. The duty to
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lies through the

The Court, therefore, went well beyond a simple reply to the first question
posed to it. It was explicit that "under the Constitution of Canada" Quebec could
not secede "unilaterally". But it went on to lay out the road map for a multilateral
process that might, consistently with the Constitution, lead to the departure of
Quebec. Perhaps this is why, in a striking departure from past practice, the Court
declined to close its judgement with Yes or No answers to the questions asked
by the government. Instead, it merely concluded that "[t]he reference questions
are answered accordingly". 18 More than one commentator has found this result
anomalous. Canadian governments are under a binding duty to act after an
affirmative referendum result. But the exact contours of those duties are not
subject to legal resolution and the breach of those duties is not subject to legal
redress. Such matters are left entirely to the unsupervised decisions of political
actors. Michael Mandel expressed the point vividly:
To appreciate how really extraordinary this is, imagine if, at the end of a trial, the
judge said, instead of "guilty" or "not guilty", that "the guilty one is the one who
clearly did it, but Ileave it to the prosecutorand the accused to decide who that is. As for
me, I'm outa here." 19
This state of affairs, however, is not really that exceptional. It is a fundamental
feature of the constitution of Canada (and of the United Kingdom, and of New
Zealand, too) that many of the most critical norms of public behavior are not
enforceable by legal action. These norms are the "conventions" of the constitution.
Peter Hogg defines conventions as "rules of the constitution that are not enforced
by the courts", "best regarded as non-legal rules". Though without legal sanction,
"conventions are, in fact, nearly always obeyed by the officials whose conduct
they regulate" .20 The central place of conventions in the operation of
parliamentary government cannot be overstated. Responsible government, itself,
depends on conventions requiring the Queen or Governor-General to choose
ministers that have the confidence of Parliament and to act only on the advice of
bargain in good faith has been the object of adjudication for decades. See, e.g.,
H.W. ARTHURS, D.

17

18
19

20

CARTERS,

e.a.,

LABOUR LAW IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN CANADA,

259

(4thed. 1992). In the context of the Canadian Constitution the duty framed in the
Secession Reference is only the latest in a series of such duties developed in recent
years. See Dwight Newman, Reconstituting Promises to Negotiate in Canadian
Constitution-Making,10 NAT. J. CONST. L 1 (1999).
Para. 102.
Para. 156. See Mary Dawson, Reflections on the Opinionof the Supreme Court in the
Quebec Secession Reference, 11 NAT. J. CONST. L 5, 7 (1999-2000).
See Michael, Mandel, Solomonic or Mulronic, 7 CANADA WATCH 86 (1999); See also
Monahan, supra note 13 at 84; Peter Hogg, The Duty to Negotiate, 7 CANADA WATCH
1,3 (1999); Robin Elliott, References, Structural Argumentation and the Organizing
Principlesof Canada'sConstitution, 8 CAN. B. REV. 67, 94-95 (2001).
PETER W. HocG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 17-18 (1998 student ed.) Dicey said
conventions "are not in reality laws at all since they are not enforced by the Courts."
A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION cxli (8" ed.

1915) (1982 reprint).
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those ministers. Eugene Forsey accurately described the role of conventions when
he called the strict law of the Constitution the skeleton of the body politic and
21
conventions its sinews and nerves.
The duty to negotiate declared in the Secession Reference is very hard to
distinguish from a convention. Like a convention it is a binding norm of
constitutional conduct. And like a convention its "breach is a matter for the
political process and public opinion, not the legal process and the courts".22 While
the courts have never enforced conventions they have, on rare occasions, defined
and articulated them. 23 Indeed the outcome of the Secession Reference bears a
remarkable parallel to the Supreme Court's most prominent previous
24
intervention in the constituent debate, the judgment in the PatriationReference
in 1981. In that case the Court heard appeals from three provincial Courts of
Appeals whose governments had submitted reference questions concerning the
federal government's plan to seek amendment of the Constitution by the
Westminster Parliament without the agreement of provincial governments. All
three provincial references had explicitly inquired as to the presence of either a
law or a convention that might authorize or prohibit such an action. The majority
of the justices held there was no law preventing this course of action but that it
would be contrary to a constitutional convention.
In the PatriationReference the Court affirmed the strict legal power of the federal
government to act unilaterally to affect major changes in the constitution. But it
held a non-justiciable constitutional norm - the convention of provincial
agreement - obliged it to negotiate that result with other units in the federation
if it wanted to use that legal power. In the Secession Reference the Court denied,
as matter of strict law, that Quebec had the power to effect unilateral
constitutional change. But again it held that a non-justiciable constitutional
obligation enjoined the other units in the federation to negotiate the changes
that Quebec demanded. In each case, that is, the legal state of affairs was
significantly modified by an unenforceable political requirement. In each case,
the latter requirement effectively promoted a political negotiation.
Notwithstanding this strong similarity, the terminology employed in the two
references is distinctly different. Given the definition of convention and its
employment in the PatriationReference one would expect that the same device
would have been exploited in the Secession Reference. But it appears that the
Supreme Court quite deliberately avoided that course in 1998. There, too, the
Court made two references to conventions in its judgement. In introducing the
idea of "underlying principles" it said these "include constitutional conventions",
but then went on to describe its four principles without using that terminology.
Even more pointedly, in defending its decision that judicial recourse was
inappropriate to resolve claims of breach of the duty to negotiate, it referred to
21

22

Eugene Forsey, The Courts and the Conventions of the Constitution, 33 U. N. B. L. J.
11, 12 (1983).
Warren J. Newman, "Grand EntranceHall", Backdoor or FoundationStone? The Role
of ConstitutionalPrinciples in Construingand Applying the Constitution of Canada,
((2001) 14 SuP. CT. L. REV. (2d. ser.) 197, 200-01.

2

Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] S.C.R. 753; Reference
re Objection by Quebec to Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1982] S.C.R.
793.
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conventions as constitutional rules that carry "only political sanctions". "It is
also the case, however," the court went on to say, "that judicial intervention,
even in relation to the law of the Constitution, is subject to the Court's
25
appreciation of its proper role in the constitutional scheme."
In the PatriationReference, of course, the Court was explicitly asked about the
constraints of convention. 26 That was to be expected. The three references on
appeal were instituted by three of the provincial governments (the "gang of
eight") opposing the federal government's threatened unilateral action. The
legal case for restraining unilateral patriation was judged to be weak (as was
ultimately confirmed by the Supreme Court's 7-2 decision on the point). The
decision on the part of the "gang of eight" to proceed by reference instead of
legal action was dictated in part by the former's better ability to test the
convention question. 27 The Secession Reference, on the other hand, was initiated
by the federal government. Its strong suit was once again the law. It had no
interest in learning if the Court thought there were conventional norms on the
subject of secession. Still the text of the question was broad enough to include a
discussion of conventions as well as law. The power of Quebec was to be assessed
"under the Constitution of Canada". 2 Under common usage that included both
29
the law of the constitution and its conventions.
Indeed, the possibility that constitutional conventions might be important in
understanding the extent of constitutional authority related to secession had
already been prominently mooted in the secession debate. Daniel Turp argued
that the behaviour and conduct of officials during and after the 1980 referendum
amounted to a recognition that a successful referendum would oblige the rest of
Canada to accede to Quebec's sovereignty. It demonstrated, that is, the existence
of a convention that "would entail the obligation [of the federal and other
provincial parliaments] of making the constitutional amendments necessary to
give [secession] effect and thereby allow Quebec to withdraw from
Confederation".30 The Court, itself, at the hearing on the reference, inquired
24
Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] S.C.R. 753.
25
Paras. 32, 98. See NEWMAN, supra note 13 at 43.
26
Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] S.C.R. 753, 762.
27
R. ROMANOW, J. WHYrE, & H. LEESON, "CANADA... NOTWITHSTANDING: THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 1976-1982, 160-63 (1984). The federal government had, in fact,
justified its own refusal to resolve the provincial objections by reference to its
conviction that the whole amendment process was governed by convention,
something it maintained was not appropriate for judicial resolution. See P. Russell,
Bold Statecraft, QuestionableJurisprudence in AND No ONE CHEERED: FEDERALISM,
DEMOCRACY AND THE CONSTITUTION ACT (K. Banting & R. Simeon, eds. 1983).
28
Para. 2.
29
Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] S.C.R.753,883-84 ("The
foregoing may be summarized in an equation: conventions plus constitutional
law equal the total constitution of the country.") But see Mark D. Walters, Nationalism
and the Pathology of Legal Systems: Consideringthe Quebec Secession Reference and
Its Lessons for the United Kingdom, 62 MOD.L. REV. 371, 383 (1999) (Conventions
"may form part of the Constitution in a broad sense, but they cannot be part of the
"Constitution of Canada" that forms the "supreme law" that prevails over
conflicting law...")
30
Daniel Turp, Quebec's Democratic Right to Self-Determination: A Critical and Legal
Reflection in TANGELED WEB: LEGAL ASPECTS OF DE-CONFEDERATION 99,103-107 (S. Hart
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about the possibility of a relevant convention, a point on which the parties
responded in later written submissions.31
The Court must have considered, however, in light of its own earlier
pronouncements on the criteria for recognizing constitutional conventions, that
it did not have the option of declaring a convention requiring negotiation in
case of a favourable referendum result. In the PatriationReference the Court had
adopted the criteria for finding a convention developed by the British
commentator W. Ivor Jennings:
We have to ask ourselves three questions: first what are the precedents; secondly
did the actors in the precedents believe they were bound by a rule; and thirdly, is
there a reason for the rule? A single precedent with a good reason may be enough
to establish the rule. A whole string of precedents without such a reason will be of
no avail, unless it is perfectly certain that the persons concerned regarded them as
bound by it.32
The Court applied these requirements in finding a convention necessitating
"substantial" provincial assent to the patriation amendments. The following year,
after the Constitution Act, 1982 had been approved and was waiting to be
proclaimed in force, Quebec initiated a reference claiming that the provincial
assent convention had to be understood as requiring Quebec's approval as part
of such substantial agreement. It was able to cite an impressive list of precedents
supported by the historical acceptance of "duality" as a Canadian constitutional
principle. The Supreme Court, faced with the prospect of declaring illegitimate
the constitutional arrangements now in place, applied the Jennings criteria with
a special rigor. With respect to the requirement that the actors involved believed
they were bound, the Court insisted on proof of explicit statements
acknowledging a Quebec veto over constitutional amendments by both federal
and provincial officials. 33 There might well be reasons (of the kind discussed by
the Court in the Secession Reference) for a convention obliging federal and
provincial authorities to negotiate secession on an affirmative referendum vote.
But there certainly were no precedents for such behaviour and no statements by
officials acknowledging such an obligation. Unless it were to repudiate the
precedent of the Quebec Veto Reference, a convention requiring negotiation did
not seem possible.' 4

31

32
33

e.a. eds., 1992). A response to Turp's argument was given in Jeremy Webber, The
Legality of UnilateralDeclarationof IndependenceUnder CanadianLaw, 42 McGILL L.J.
281, 303-04 (1997). See also Fabien Gelinas, Les conventions, le droit et la constitution
de Canada dans le renvoi sur la 'secession' du Quebec: lefantome du repatriement, 57
REVUE Du BARREAU (QUEBEC) 291 (1997) (arguing the existence of a convention
permitting Quebec secession and the possibility of such a convention
"crystallizing" into enforceable law).
See e.g. Written Response of the Attorney-General of Canada to Questions from
the Supreme Court of Canada, http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/const/
replyqa5.html.
Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] S.C.R. 753, 888.
Reference re Objection by Quebec to Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1982]
S.C.R. 793, 814-17.
The Court was possibly reminded of these requirements by the Attorney-General
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Nevertheless, the Court's construction of a non-textual and non-justiciable
"constitutional duty" is identical in effect to the declaration of a convention.
Both devices, moreover, highlight the very anomalous role that the Court has
carved out for itself in the debate on the place of Quebec in Canada. That debate
is not amenable to legal resolution that will be recognized as such by the
contending parties. Canadian law - including its constitutional law presupposes a legitimate Canadian polity. But, in this case, the legitimacy of
that polity is itself in contest. That is, citations to the supremacy of law make no
sense when, as in this case, the very authority of the law has been put into issue.3"
This point is central and bears some amplification. The application of positive
law to any dispute presupposes that the parties to the dispute are already bound
to the observation of that law. Imagine two homeowners, L and R, on adjoining
properties. R proposes to erect a structure. L claims it will encroach on his
property and, in support, produces a deed setting forth the boundary. If R
responds that L has misunderstood the deed, the dispute may be settled based
on some authoritative interpretation of that document, say one issued by a court
of law whose jurisdiction both parties recognize. If, however, R says the deed is
a forgery, or that it was induced by fraud, or that the law giving effect to deeds
is invalid, he will surely not be satisfied by arguments based on the deed's
language. Of course, in this hypothetical case, R's claims might be dealt with by
a decision premised on other controlling law - the law concerning the
effectiveness of deeds or the constitution of the state. But when R denies the
authority of the whole legal system, there are no anterior norms that can resolve
the dispute. This does not mean a legal system cannot be effective unless every
person whose conduct it purports to govern subjectively accepts it. But the
force of that system over such dissidents will rest, ultimately, not on shared
36
attitudes towards the authority of law but on the ability to coerce.

35

36

of Canada's written response to its questions about a convention (probably
understood, at the time, to refer to a convention recognizing secession as discussed
above). Written Response of the Attorney-General of Canada to Questions from
the Supreme Court of Canada, http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/ const/
replyqa5.html. See also Newman, supra note 22 at 3-4.
On the irrelevance of law to fundamental constituent questions see Richard Kay,
Courts as Constitution-Makersin Canadaand the United States, 4 Sup. CT. L. REV. 23
(1982).
Ido not wish to engage here the question of whether or not every new independent
legal system must logically be characterized as resting on a non-legal basis. In the
context of the independence of former British colonies this has been said to turn
on whether the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament is "continuing" (so
that no parliament may bind its successors) or "self-embracing" (so that a future
parliament may be so bound.) See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 149-52 (2d.
ed. 1994); Peter Oliver, The 1982 Patriationof the CanadianConstitution: Reflections
on Continuityand Change, 28 THEMIs, 876 (1994). With respect to the possibility of a
secession of Quebec in accordance with Canadian law this turns on the capacity
of such an action to be accomplished by the amending procedures or the
Constitution Act, 1982. See para. 84 (secession possible by amendment). But see
Jacques Fremont & Francois Boudreault, Supraconsitutionalitecanadienneet secession
du Quebec, 8 NAT.

J.

CONST. L. 163 (1997) (contra). Whatever the ultimate

characterization of a successful secession by historians and legal theorists, however,
most advocates of a future secession will not, for reasons discussed, regard the
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This proposition may explain the apparent bewilderment of Quebec separatist
leaders in response to the idea that the Supreme Court, a creature of (not to say
appointees of), the very entity they wished to reject, could have something useful
to say about the secession question. 37 The secessionist project is premised on the
proposition that the institutional machinery constituting the Canadian state and
legal system lack the political legitimacy necessary to command obedience from
an unwilling Quebec. This attitude also underlay the Quebec government's
refusal to participate in the argument of the reference. The amicus curiae, arguing
the case for a Quebec secession power, also challenged the jurisdiction of the
court, claiming that the issues involved in the reference concerned "the origin
and existence of the state". As such they were "purely political" and inappropriate
for judicial decision.38 Even in his claim that an effective unilateral secession
had to be recognized in Canadian law the amicus highlighted the pre-legal (or
as the amicus put it, the "meta-constitutional" or "hyper-constitutional 39 )
character of the questions posed to the Court. In an extraordinary reference he
noted that all English law (and derivatively all Canadian law) could trace its
legal pedigree no further back than the Glorious Revolution of 1688-1689, which,
itself, was an act inconsistent with existing constitutional norms:
La Constitution britannique a te modifiee profond~ment dans des circonstances
exceptionelles: ou la lgitimit6 politique 6tait incompatible avec la Constitution
formelle. Le nouvel ordre constitutionnel issu des 6v~nements politiques de 1688
est valid6 juridiquement par lar~gle selon laquelle un changement politique
40
fondamental et effectif entraine par lui mdme un changement constitutionnel.
He went on to cite Blackstones's Commentaries in which the great eighteenth
century authority on English law conceded the impossibility of reconciling the
revolution with English law:
In these, therefore, or other circumstances which a fertile imagination may furnish
since both law and history are silent, it behooves us to be silent too, leaving to
future generations, whenever necessity and the safety of the whole shall require
it, the exertion of those inherent though latent powers of society which no climate,
no time, no constitution, no contract, can ever destroy or diminish. 1

37

3

strictures of Canadian law as relevant to the justness of their position.
See e.g. Portland Press Herald, Feb. 18,1998, 8A (Quoting Lucien Bouchard: "Ottawa
is asking judges it appoints unilaterally to rule on a constitution it imposed
unilaterally so it can unilaterally oppose democracy.")
Mdmoire de l'amicus curiae, December 18, 1997, para. 41 (Ces questions touchent
directement A l'origine et I 'existence d'un tat. I1s'agit de questions purement
politiques, exclues de lajurisdiction des tribunaux. La Cour devrait refuser de

r~pondre.").

40
41

Id. at para. 135 citing H. HALLAM , THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 674
(1847). On the invulnerability of pre-legal norms to ordinary legal change see
Jacques Fremont & Francois Boudreault, supra note 35 at 163 (1997); See generally
Richard S. Kay, Pre-ConstitutionalRules, 42 OHIO. S. L.J. 187 (1981).
Id. at para. 127.
Id. at para. 128 quoting W. BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONES COMMENTARIES: THE CONSTTUION
AND

LAWS

245 (1803 American ed.)
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These arguments were put forward to convince the Court to answer the
reference question so as to allow the possibility of a successful unilateral secession
under Canadian law. But they are more powerful authority for the proposition
that such events are simply not susceptible to legal - and therefore judicial analysis or control.
The Supreme Court's response to this argument was to confine its inquiry to
the legality of the secession at the moment of its occurrence. In its discussion of
international law the Court acknowledged that a successful secession of Quebec
could give rise to a new legal reality without regard to its consistency with
Canadian law. "No one doubts", it conceded "that legal consequences may flow
from political facts and that 'sovereignty is a political fact for which no purely
legal authority can be constituted..."'. The latter quotation, from one of the
best known modern articles analyzing the essentially non-legal basis of every
system of law, had been cited by the amicus curiae.42 In both the international
law and Canadian law holdings the Court correctly noted that a revolution's
subsequent achievement of legality did not operate retroactively so as mean
that it was lawful ab initio.43 That is, the Court took its charge to be an evaluation
of the legality of secession within the existing Canadianlegal system. The reference
procedure, the federal and provincial governments and Parliaments and the
Court itself are all creatures of Canadian law. These institutions can hardly be
expected to approach the subject from what H.L.A. Hart called the "external"
viewpoint - that of a person feeling no obligation toward the system of law
involved.' From the "internal" point of view the Court's holding that there
was no unilateral right of secession was entirely predictable, indeed inevitable.
This understanding of the Court's attitude still needs to be reconciled with its
declaration of fundamental principles and the duty to negotiate. As the Court
formulated them, these norms are not designed to operate only within a single
ongoing and uninterrupted Canadian legal system. They are, rather, explicitly
applicable also to the process whereby that system may come to an end and a
new system or systems will emerge. 4 The Court based its determination to leave
the execution of these constitutional duties entirely to the political process on
the ground that the standards enunciated could only be measured against
"political judgements and evaluations... [about which] [o]nly the political actors
have the [necessary] information and expertise... "46 But courts have long
supervised complicated negotiations in other contexts, such as collective
42

43
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bargaining, with reasonable success.47 The real inability of courts in this context
stems not from their limited fact-finding and judging abilities but from the reality
that, in the context of fundamental constituent decisions, they lack the first thing
a court needs to deal with any controversy - a rule of law.
How, then, will this judgement affect future decisions about the place of Quebec
in confederation? As with its holdings on unenforceable constitutional
conventions governing the process of constitutional amendment, the judgement
"could have political consequences but no legal ones". 4 Notwithstanding its
assertions that the duty to negotiate was rooted in binding law, the Court's
statements amount only to a plea for a certain kind of behaviour by the political
actors after a potential yes vote in the next Quebec referendum. This was the
point made by Greg Craven shortly after the decision:
[T]he Canadian Supreme Court's demands for considered negotiation undoubtedly
are not intended to operate primarily as some fully binding legal pronouncement.
Rather, they are cast so as to stigmatize those who would seek to resolve Canada's
dilemma without such bilateral accommodation as constitutional outlaws, acting
outside conventional modes of constitutional morality.
What the Court is apparently attempting to do is to force political and other players
to the negotiating table by effectively pronouncing a rule of constitutional morality
in favour of negotiation. True, there are appropriately broad references to this or
that provision of the Constitution of Canada, but in essence this is a judgment of
political morality, not law. .. 9
Another commentator, much more enthusiastic about the judgement, supports
the idea that there was something less "legal" in the Secession Reference. James
McHugh noted that the Court eschewed its usual technical legal language
(contrasting it in particular to the reasons for judgement in the PatriationReference)
in favour of rhetoric more "politically and philosophically expressive".58
Similarly, John Whyte observed that the Court saw its job as one of "putting in
place certain moral demarcations" in the hopes that "the protagonists believe
that legitimacy matters". 51 The Court defended its determination to deal only
in "identification of the relevant aspects of the Constitution in their broadest
sense" and to renounce any future judicial roles as a proper abstention from
purely political controversy- 2 Paradoxically, that very approach meant that the
Court's participation in the constituent debate (insofar as the duty to negotiate
47
48
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50
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is concerned) was solely political.13 Its judgement could have no effect other
than its influence on the political behaviour of the non-judicial politicians.
One might have expected the Court's declaration of principles to be most
immediately employed in further constitutional litigation. As Warren Newman
observed, "[iut did not take the proverbial rocket scientist (or to modernize the
simile; a web page designer) to realize that a whole new vista of legal argument
had just opened up". To prove the point he cited a number of instances where
constitutional principles had been raised "within days" of the release of the
judgement in the Secession Reference. 4 It seems that lower courts have been
distinctly uncomfortable dealing with such insubstantial notions.55 In one of
the first cases in which the Supreme Court's principles were entertained by a
provincial appellate court, the Court of Appeals of Alberta refused the request
of a popularly selected Senate candidate that it issue a declaration that the
appointment of any person who had not been endorsed in such a vote was
"contrary to democratic principles". The court recoiled from such an action:
Non-legal matters of, among other things, morality and politics are not within the
court's jurisdiction ....
[The appellant] wants the court to look at the appointment
process and to make a statement on whether or not the process is democratic...
We agree with the Crown that "the appellant "seeks to invoke the democratic
principle per se, divorced of its interpretive role, and devoid of legal issues simply
because a declaration from the court would, in his view, "have considerable
persuasive effect,
and it would confer democratic legitimacy on the Senatorial
56
Selection Act".

The actual holding in the Secession Reference, however, seems to do exactly
what the Alberta court said a court should not do - use a broad constitutional
principle solely for its persuasive effect in order to confer legitimacy on one
kind of political process. In general, courts that have been presented with
arguments based on "constitutional principles" have treated them respectfully
but it is hard to pinpoint many cases where they have been taken so seriously as
to change a result.5 7
53

It is worth noting that the duty to negotiate might be inferred (less controversially)
from the constitution's statement that any legislative assembly may initiate the
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Commission de restructuration des service de sante) [2001] O.J. No. 4767 the
Ontario Court of Appeal held that the direction of the Commission reducing
services at the province's only hospital providing all services in French was invalid.
The court interpreted the Commission's statutory authority to require greater
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Notwithstanding its failure to affect litigation on other matters, and its explicitly
non-justiciable character, the Reference may well make a difference in the way
the Quebec question unfolds in the future. One much noted development was
a direct consequence of the Reference. That is Bill C-20, the federal "Clarity Bill",
which received the royal assent in June 2000.58 This Act called for the federal
House of Commons to review the clarity of any proposed secession question
and of the result of any referendum. It forbids the federal government from
entering into negotiations as a result of any process not satisfying this scrutiny.
This bill, which predictably infuriated the Quebec government,59 was entitled
"An Act to give effect to the requirement for clarity as set out in the opinion of
the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference." Its preamble
provides a series of "whereas" clauses each referring to aspects of the Supreme
Court's judgement. The bill was defended by citation to and quotations from
the Reference. 6° The Quebec Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs called it "a
61
crude rewriting of the Supreme Court's opinion".
On its face, the Clarity Act speaks only to the response of the federal
government when the next referendum is proposed. Like all political action
concerning Quebec, however, it will also affect the sentiments of the Quebec
electorate and that, in turn, may help determine whether there is a referendum
and, if there is, how it will turn out. The Supreme Court's unenforceable dicta
may influence the course of the sovereignty movement in other ways as well.
For example, Premier Bouchard attempted to drum up pro-sovereignty sentiment
by quickly declaring that the Reference result dispelled the federal intimations
62
of chaos following a "yes" vote by dictating an orderly process of negotiation.
The opinion, if followed, could also alter the post-referendum negotiations
themselves. First, of course, it would go far towards ensuring that, after a proper
result, prompt negotiations do, in fact, take place. While that was likely in any
event, 63 the federal government may have attempted, at least in the first instance,
to employ other options to test the seriousness of the Quebec position. The Court's
insistence that the negotiations proceed in accordance with the four "organising
principles" especially as they were elaborated in the judgment may alter the
parties' relative bargaining positions. Thus the Court set out an agenda of topics
that negotiations would have to resolve, mentioning particularly the national
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/www.cex.gouv.qc.ca /saic.
PremierLucien Bouchard Reflects on the Ruling in THE QUEBEC DECISION: PERSPECTIVES
ON THE SUPREME

63

COURT RULING ON SECESSION

Peter Hogg, supra note 19 at 3.

95, 97 (D. Schneiderman, ed. 1999).

Otago Law Review

(2003) Vol 10 No 3

debt and the rights of minorities. 6 Its statement that the Canadian national
existence could not "be effortlessly separated along what are now the provincial
boundaries of Quebec" 6 is an almost explicit insistence that the boundaries of
an independent Quebec be settled in the negotiations. Since separatist leaders
have vigorously proclaimed this issue as non-negotiable, the Court's intervention
66
may powerfully strengthen the federalist side in post-referendum talks.
All of these effects presume that the future conduct of the public officials will
conform to this aspect of the Court's opinion, even though no judicial recourse
will be available to oversee and correct any deviations. Most observers agree
that the judgement will turn out to be a central point of reference in future
decisions.67 There is a convincing precedent in the aftermath of the Patriation
Reference where the Court also expounded (in the form of a constitutional
convention) judicially unenforceable standards for the proper making and
unmaking of a Canadian constitution. The judgement of the Supreme Court in
that case was released on September 28, 1981. In it the Court affirmed the strict
legality of the federal government's proposal to seek amendments of the
constitution from Westminster while, at the same time, taking note of a
constitutional convention that barred such action without a "substantial degree"
of provincial assent. The provincial opponents of unilateral patriation
emphasized the convention holding. Rene Levesque announced that "the federal
6
government [had] lost its moral authority to act without provincial consent". 1
The federal government, at first, discounted the importance of the convention
and declared victory based on the court's interpretation of the law. The day
after the judgment Prime Minister Trudeau said he was prepared to do what the
Supreme Court "clearly and massively indicated we have the legal authority to
do .... I see no alternative but to press on".69 The Minister of Justice, Jean
Chretien, spoke directly to the relevance of the convention. He insisted it had
"nothing to do with law". "Convention is in the political arena", he said. "When
you go in front of the court you go for legality." 7o
64
65
66
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keeping out of the political process.) The Supreme Court may face another
opportunity to intervene in these decisions as the result of litigation commenced
in 2002 in the Quebec Superior court seeking a declaration of the unconstitutionality
of Quebec's Bill 99, passed in the wake of the Secession Reference and the Clarity
Act. In this legislation the National Assembly declared the legal right of Quebec
to decide its own status. The federal government has intervened to argue against
Quebec's claim that the issue is non-justiciaible. See Paul Wells, So Now It's Not
About Secession, NATnONAL Posr, March 19, 2002 available in WESTLAW Allnews
database.
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But it soon became apparent that there was a widely held perception that,
with or without strict legal licence, unilateral action by the federal government
would be an unacceptable defiance of the Supreme Court. The provincial
opponents again stressed the convention. Roy Romanow explained that to breach
the convention "would be analogous to the Governor-General dissolving
parliament on a whim and inviting Ed Broadbent to be Prime Minister". 7
"Haven't politicians the duty to obey the constitutional rules without being forced
to do so by the courts", Levesque asked.72 The press mainly agreed. The Globe
and Mail said the federal government should not ignore the convention aspect
of the judgment just because it had a legal right to do so. The Vancouver Province
said the Court's discussion of the need for provincial agreement was "far more
important than the issue of strict legality". 73
Perhaps more significantly, Ed Broadbent, whose New Democratic party had
supported the government's constitutional project in Parliament, insisted that a
new conference of premiers be called to seek agreement as the price of his
continued support: "You don't have a Supreme Court decision and ignore it."74
And more ominously yet, there were signs that if the Court's convention
judgment were not taken as binding in Ottawa it would be at Westminster. A
visiting British MP said the "racing odds would be 6 to 4 that Westminster would
refuse patriation if Trudeau acted without a provincial deal.75 The Thatcher
government warned that it could not promise parliamentary approval unless
provincial assent were obtained. 76 In his first reaction to the judgment Trudeau
had conceded the desirability of some kind of understanding with the provincial
opponents. On October 23 he agreed to a conference on November 2 in Ottawa.
While he and Chretien continued to insist that they would proceed on the basis
of their legal authority if no agreement were reached, the pressure for
accommodation was substantial. 77 The rest, as they say, is constitutional history.
It is generally agreed that the Court's intervention was a central causative factor
in the final compromise. Commenting after the Ottawa agreement, Stephen Scott
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said: "Had two Supreme Court judges switched their vote on the matter of
"convention", we might have a completely different country today."7 8
Although its impact will be less dramatic in the short run, there is little reason
to doubt that the Supreme Court's framework for a possible Quebec secession
will be similarly influential in the eventual political outcome of any future
referendum. That is, the Supreme Court will again be a decisive player in basic
constituent decisions. Some find this prospect disquieting. Most of the objections
to the Court's intervention have turned on questions of authority. In a powerful
legal critique of the judgment Patrick Monahan questioned the Court's right to
claim its decision was based on a genuine interpretation of the Constitution.
The Court described its formulation of fundamental principles as necessary to
fill in "gaps" in the written constitution. Monahan points out the great breadth
of those principles and that there is no fixed relation of priority among them.79
No "one principle", the Court said, may "trump or exclude the operation of any
other". 80 Thus the Court retains for itself the critical, and largely undefined, role
of balancing the force of the competing principles in each particular context, an
activity in which the constitutional texts themselves will play little part.8 '
According to Robin Elliott, the Court's approach treats the Constitution as an
"illustrative document" rather than as a "definitive document". 82 Eugene Forsey
voiced the same kind of criticism after the Court's judgment in the Patriation
Reference. He worried about "suppression of the law set out in the written
Constitution by judicially determined 'convention"'. The critics' understanding
of what the Court did in the Secession Reference is consistent with that of
commentators more friendly to the judgment, including Mark Walters, who
described it as "premised on a brand of anti-postivism according to which written
and entrenched constitutions are not sovereign at all" .83
Such authority-based objections to the participation of the Supreme Court in
the process of constitution-making amount to a charge that the Court has
assumed for itself a function to which it is not entitled according to some posited
set of constitutional rules. They suppose, that is, that the destruction and
reconstruction of legal systems is subject to pre-existing law. That is exactly
what I have argued cannot be the case given the logical priority of the political
foundation of the legal system to any constitutional rules of that system. If the
Court is to be faulted therefore, it may be mainly for some kind of intentional or
unintentional misrepresentation. It purported to act as the oracle of already
binding law on a subject for which no such law exists.' It is reasonable, moreover,
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to believe that the regard for the Court's viewpoint will be a consequence of the
deferential attitude of public officials and the general population towards the
commands of the law. Warren Newman found "the sagacity-the brilliance even"
of the Reference in "the Court's having had the vision to wed the value of
constitutional legality with that of political legitimacy".8 5 Had the Court not
proclaimed its judgment based on principles having "full legal force",8 6 but
instead suggested the negotiation it outlined would be sensible but not
"constitutionally" required, its impact might well be different. 7 In this respect,
at least, the judgement is, indeed, as David Schneiderman described it, "a clever
piece of business".88
Still, the Supreme Court cannot logically be charged with usurpation. The
very law-less character of the constituent debate means that no judicial agency
can logically invoke the law in favour or one result or another. In debating the
essential character of the Constitution, Canadians are necessarily bereft of the
comfort of accepted law. Rather, they find themselves in the situation described
by a delegate to the New York Constitutional Convention of 1821. Responding
to an accusation that the convention had overreached its mandate, he said "Sir,
we are standing on the foundations of society. The elements of government are
scattered around us." 9 But, on the very same grounds, no person and no
collection of persons can be disqualified in this state of affairs, on legal grounds,
from participating in the constituent decisions. Admittedly, the Supreme Court's
intervention has no claim to be deferred to in the presumptive way of genuinely
legal pronouncements. But its viewpoint may be respected based on its intrinsic
persuasiveness and on the regard which people have for the wisdom and
experience of the men and women who comprise the Court. Ironically, perhaps,
the misimpression that the Court is the mere agent of some pre-existing law
may give a useful head start to the new constitutional arrangements given the
regard for legal regularity in Canadian political culture. 9 In a position paper on
constitutional amendment published during the patriation debate, the federal
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government accurately noted that "Canadians take pride in the fact that our
Constitution, unlike those of many nations, is entirely lawful, both in its origins
and its subsequent developments". 91 Whatever the reality, the perception of an
unbroken chain of legality may have its uses. And in constitutional matters,
once we have left the domain of legality, utility is the first, and perhaps the only,
measure of propriety.
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